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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Terrance Hardee was convicted by jury of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
conspiracy to commit robbery. He was sentenced to 92 months’ incarceration on each 
count to be served concurrently. The Government has appealed his sentence and argues 
that the District Court procedurally erred by failing to consider Hardee’s career offender 
status in determining his sentence.  We will reverse and remand for resentencing. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
Hardee’s convictions stem from an ATF1-initiated criminal investigation of Ralph 
Dennis, one of Hardee’s coconspirators. Based on this investigation, the ATF engaged 
Dennis, through a confidential informant, in a fictitious stash house robbery. The 
confidential informant told Dennis that a disgruntled drug courier for a drug dealer, an 
undercover ATF agent, had told the confidential informant that at least 15 kilograms of 
cocaine was in the drug dealer’s stash house. In order to implement the robbery, Dennis 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 
3 
 
recruited Hardee and another coconspirator, John Mitchell. Through Dennis, the 
confidential informant, and the ATF agent each conspirator was made aware that at least 
15 kilograms or more of cocaine was in the stash house. This was confirmed at a final 
pre-robbery meeting. Once the ATF had the conspirators’ confirmations at that meeting, 
law enforcement officers moved in, arrested the conspirators, and recovered two guns. 
Based on these events, a three-count superseding indictment was filed, charging 
Dennis and Hardee with: conspiracy to commit robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a); conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A); and use of a firearm during the commission 
of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).2 Both Hardee and 
Dennis proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Dennis of all charges. Hardee was convicted 
of the conspiracy charges but acquitted of the firearm charge. The jury also found that the 
drug quantity for the distribution conspiracy was 5 kilograms or more of cocaine despite 
the option of a lesser included offense of 500 grams or more. This verdict carried the 
possibility of a life sentence and a mandatory minimum 10-year sentence.  
Because of the firearm conviction, Dennis was subject to an additional 5-year 
mandatory consecutive sentence. He was sentenced to the mandatory minimums for the 
firearm and the distribution charges, 15 years’ incarceration, a variance from his 
applicable career offender Guidelines range. The Government did not appeal. 
                                              
2 Mitchell cooperated with the Government and separately pleaded guilty. 
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After Hardee’s conviction, a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was completed. The PSR 
indicated that Hardee was a career offender. Hardee’s career offender status, coupled 
with the possible sentence of life imprisonment, resulted in a total offense level of 37, a 
criminal history category of VI, and a Guidelines range of 360 months’ imprisonment to 
life imprisonment. The PSR’s calculations were based on a drug quantity of 15 kilograms 
or more, the amount of fictitious drugs in the stash house.3  
Hardee’s sentencing spanned two hearings. At the first hearing, the District Court 
recognized the findings in the PSR. However, the District Court was concerned that the 
fictitious drug quantity, 15 kilograms or more, was substantially more than what Hardee 
had previously been convicted of possessing or distributing, which it considered to be 
sentencing manipulation. The District Court stated that it was considering: (1) reducing 
Hardee’s criminal history category from VI to V because his criminal history category 
overrepresented his criminal record; (2) reducing the drug quantity to 500 grams or more 
of cocaine, due to sentencing manipulation, which would reduce the maximum sentence 
to 25 years and the total offense level to 34; and (3) finding that Hardee’s Guidelines 
range was 235 to 293 months’ incarceration, before a variance. Notably, the District 
Court stated that Hardee was a career offender and its suggested findings reflected that 
designation.  
                                              
3 The drug quantity considered at sentencing may differ from the quantity 
underlying a defendant’s conviction. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  
5 
 
After the prosecutor requested further briefing of the sentencing manipulation 
issue, the District Court continued the sentencing hearing. The prosecutor, however, did 
not submit a follow-up brief. She instead filed a letter incorporating a previous sentencing 
memorandum in which she argued that Hardee was a career offender and the 360 months 
to life imprisonment Guidelines range applied without any variance.  
Hardee’s second sentencing hearing was held almost five months later. At that 
hearing, the District Court indicated that it agreed with the PSR’s findings regarding the 
robbery conspiracy charge. The District Court did not restate the finding that the total 
offense level was 34; however, it reiterated its criminal history category and drug 
quantity findings from the first hearing. Based on those findings, the District Court 
announced, for the first time, a base offense level of 24 while still recognizing that it 
could only reduce the criminal history category by one because of Hardee’s career 
offender designation. The prosecutor inquired of the District Court whether the career 
offender guideline would be applied, because the District Court had previously 
announced a total offense level of 34, and that she believed Hardee was still subject to a 
10-year mandatory minimum sentence. The District Court indicated that it had changed 
the mandatory minimum based on the reduced drug quantity and referred to the change as 
a departure. 
After this pronouncement, in consideration of other enhancements and reductions 
not at issue on appeal, the District Court found that the total offense level was 26 before a 
variance. Based on this finding, the District Court announced a Guidelines range of 110 
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to 137 months’ incarceration. The prosecutor raised objections to the District Court’s 
drug quantity decision and its career offender finding, but also stated that she accepted 
the District Court’s career offender finding after raising these issues.  
The District Court then considered the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
Based on these factors, the District Court applied a two-level downward variance, 
resulting in a 92 to 115 months’ incarceration Guidelines range. Based on this Guidelines 
range, the District Court sentenced Hardee to 92 months on each count to be served 
concurrently. 
Thereafter, the District Court entered a judgment and conviction order along with 
a statement of reasons. The statement of reasons mirrored the pronouncements at the 
second sentencing hearing and added that the District Court had found that Hardee was 
not a career offender. The statement of reasons did not provide any indication that the 
base offense level was 37 or that the beginning Guidelines range was 360 months to life 
imprisonment. The Government appealed Hardee’s sentence. Hardee did not cross-
appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). This Court exercises 
plenary review over the sentencing court’s interpretation and application of the 
7 
 
Guidelines, exercises clear error review over determinations of fact, and gives due 
deference to the application of the Guidelines to the facts.4  
III. 
The Government asserts that the District Court procedurally erred in sentencing 
Hardee to 92 months’ incarceration. The parties disagree, however, about what issues are 
properly before this Court concerning that assertion and also about on what record this 
Court should base its review. We will consider the parties’ contentions in turn. 
A. 
Hardee contends that the Government waived several arguments before the 
District Court—the District Court’s failure to apply the career offender guidelines, the 
10-year mandatory minimum, and the correct drug quantity. The Government concedes 
that it did not preserve its argument that Hardee should have received, at least, a 10-year 
mandatory minimum sentence. The Government contends, however, that it raised the 
other allegedly waived arguments and, further, that in considering those arguments we 
should confine our analysis to the second sentencing hearing and the statement of reasons 
in which final findings were made. 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 states that a party may “preserve a claim of 
error by informing the court . . . when the court ruling . . . is made . . . of the action the 
party wishes the court to take.”5 A party’s compliance with Rule 51 does not require 
                                              
4 United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2013). 
5 Fed. R. Crim. P. 51. 
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“surgical precision,” and putting the opposing party and the sentencing judge on notice of 
objections before and at a sentencing hearing is enough to fulfill Rule 51’s requirements.6  
The record indicates that the prosecutor raised the allegedly waived issues, other 
than the 10-year mandatory minimum, in its sentencing memorandum and at least four 
times during the sentencing hearings. The Government thus fulfilled Rule 51’s 
requirements, and those issues are not waived.7 
Hardee adds, however, that if not waived before the District Court, the 
Government waived issues on appeal by not raising them in the Issue Statement. The 
Issue Statement asserts that the District Court procedurally erred in not sentencing 
Hardee as a career offender. “When an issue is either not set forth in the statement of 
issues presented or not pursued in the argument section of the brief, the appellant has 
abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.”8 The Government’s Issue Statement is 
narrow. But, broader arguments are asserted in the argument section of the Government’s 
brief. Thus, except for the 10-year mandatory minimum, the Government preserved all of 
its arguments.  
One of the Government’s preserved arguments is that this Court must focus on the 
District Court’s findings from the second sentencing hearing and in the statement of 
                                              
6 United States v. Rivera, 365 F.3d 213, 214 (3d Cir. 2004). 
7 Hardee also asserts that the Government is estopped from appealing his sentence 
because it did not appeal Dennis’s sentence. However, the Government is not estopped 
from making different arguments amongst codefendants. United States v. Dansker, 581 
F.2d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1978) (estoppel inapplicable where the Government agreed that there 
was jurisdiction for codefendants but that jurisdiction was lacking over defendant). 
8 Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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reasons. When reviewing a sentence, we must review the sentencing transcript as a 
whole.9 This Court has undertaken a review of multiple sentencing hearings to complete 
this task.10 Thus, this Court denies the Government’s request that we only consider part 
of the record.11  
B. 
In considering the record as a whole and the issues before us, we find that the 
District Court committed reversible procedural error. A district court must follow a three-
step process before deciding on a sentence. The District Court must: (1) correctly 
calculate the Guidelines; (2) review and rule on departure motions; and (3) meaningfully 
consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).12  
In order for this Court to undertake a meaningful appellate review of the District 
Court’s process, the District Court must adequately explain the chosen sentence.13 We 
review the District Court’s explanation in two stages, employing the abuse of discretion 
                                              
9 United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2007). 
10 United States v. Jarvis, 258 F.3d 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing a record 
that included an informative Guidelines range order and two sentencing hearings). 
11The Government’s focus on one, edited, pronouncement from Sole v. Wyner, 551 
U.S. 74, 84-85 (2007) (“the eventual ruling on the merits . . . supersede[s] the preliminary 
ruling”), is unavailing as well. Sole stands for the proposition that a preliminary ruling, 
hastily granted without an opportunity to consider a full record, is superseded by a later 
final ruling, based on a full record and more deliberate consideration. Id. at 84-86 
(considering an order granting a preliminary injunction and an order granting summary 
judgment). This is inapplicable to a continued sentencing hearing that was based on a 
developed trial and post-trial record. 
12 United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 
13 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 
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standard.14 The first stage, which we review here, requires this Court to determine 
whether the District Court committed a procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range . . . or failing to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence.”15 If procedural error is found, we will normally remand for 
resentencing.16 
Here, the District Court’s process was inadequately explained for meaningful 
appellate review. The District Court indicated that it was changing the base offense level 
and corresponding Guidelines range at step one because of the reductions of the criminal 
history category and drug quantity. The District Court later stated that those reductions 
were departures, a step two incorporation. In the statement of reasons, the District Court 
reverted to the initial finding that the base offense level was changed and specifically 
stated that Hardee was not a career offender, indicating that those changes were 
undertaken at step one. Consequently, the record is unclear about when, during the three-
step process, the District Court actually made the two major reductions at issue. This lack 
of clarity is procedural error. 
Moreover, if the reductions were in fact made at step one and changed the base 
offense level itself, rather than being incorporated as a departure, they were procedurally 
erroneous. At step one, a district court is tasked with correctly calculating the Guidelines 
                                              
14 United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011). 
15 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
16 United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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range as it would have when the Guidelines were mandatory.17 Accordingly, the career 
offender guidelines should have been implemented without any changes. Further, even if 
properly applied at step one, the drug quantity reduction would have still placed Hardee 
at a final offense level of 34 after application of the career offender guidelines.18  
Finally, at any part of the process, the District Court was bound by “the facts 
necessarily implicit in the [jury’s] verdict.”19 The jury found that Hardee was guilty of 
conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, even though a lesser included 
drug quantity offense, 500 grams or more, was included in the verdict form. “[D]istrict 
courts are required to sentence defendants guilty of [specific] crime[s] to a term of 
imprisonment no less than the Congressionally prescribed minimum, unless an explicit 
exception to the minimum sentence applies.”20 Given that the minimum sentence is 
congressionally mandated and an exception does not apply, the District Court was 
required to sentence Hardee to at least 120 months’ incarceration based on the jury’s 
                                              
17 Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247. 
18 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (500 grams or more of cocaine triggers a mandatory 
minimum 5-year sentence and the career offender offense level would therefore be 34 
pursuant to § 4B1.1(b) of the Guidelines). 
19 United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
20 United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis 
added) (exceptions are made for government motions pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the 
Guidelines and under the “safety valve” which applies only to offender with a criminal 
history category of 1). Neither exception applies. See id. at 392-93. 
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finding that 5 kilograms or more of cocaine was involved. This issue could therefore not 
be waived.21 Thus, significant procedural error occurred. 
Nevertheless, even if a district court commits procedural error in sentencing, this 
Court may still affirm if the error is harmless.22 The errors here, however, were not 
harmless. The record does not support a finding that there is a high probability that a 92 
months’ sentence would have been imposed if the District Court had correctly calculated 
the Guidelines range or properly considered the jury verdict.23 Thus, remand is required. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the order of the District Court and 
remand for resentencing. 
                                              
21United States v. Cordero, 313 F.3d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that even 
when the Government concedes that an exception exists, the District Court is still 
required to use the mandatory minimum sentence as the starting point, not the Guidelines 
range that would apply otherwise); United States v. Allen, 450 F.3d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 
2006) (relying on a statutory mandatory minimum sentence rather than both parties’ 
assertions that the Government had fulfilled one of the allowed exceptions to such a 
sentence). 
22 Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 386. 
23 See id. at 387. The District Court referred to Dennis’s 15-year sentence which 
incorporated the firearm conviction that did not apply to Hardee. However, the 
consideration of a possible sentencing disparity does not overcome the procedural 
missteps at steps one and two of the sentencing process. See United States v. Ali, 508 
F.3d 136, 154 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[P]reliminary errors at steps one and two taint[ ] the step 
three analysis[, which requires consideration of disparity between sentences,] and 
resulting sentence . . . .”). 
